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By Robert L. Schwartz
No ISSUE except medical malpractice
has given rise to as much argument between (and among) physicians and
lawyers as the use of an easily refined
extract of the apricot pit -laetrile. No
drug that is neither addicting nor hallucinogenic has been the subject of
such an intense eradication effort by
the government, and never before has
the response from the defenders of a
drug been so intense and constant.
Laetrile, with an allegedly active
substance that was used by ancient
Greek physicians, has been available in
the United States, legally or illegally,
for a quarter of a century. The government's increased efforts to eliminate
laetrile "pushing" by what are seen to
be profiteering physicians has created a
strengthened laetrile lobby that has
successfully fought the medical establishment and succeeded in making the
drug legal in more than a dozen states.

The pro-laetrile lobby
an assortment
of cancer patients and their families,
medical professionals, and conservative politicians -threatens to eliminate
much of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act and drastically weaken the Food
and Drug Administration.
That the mention of laetrile should
evoke vigorous self-righteousness from
both its defenders and detractors is not
surprising. Although laetrile may be, as
the government claims, only one in a
long series of cancer cure hoaxes, it has
attained its popularity at a -time when
many people are willing to question the
wisdom of conventional medicine and
the infallibility of methods of treatment, especially cancer treatment,
sanctioned by-the medical establishment. It is not difficult to understand
the desperation of cancer patients who
are told they have incurable cancer, are
terminally ill, and cannot be helped by
any medical treatment available. It is
easier yet to understand their frustra-
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tion when they are told they cannot
seek or use a harmless substance that
some people say can arrest, and perhaps even cure, what the medical profession calls incurable.
On the other hand, the American
Cancer Society's position, which is
shared by the American Medical Association and the F.D.A., also is easy to
understand. It is precisely these desperate victims and their helpless
families who need governmental protection from the latest million-dollar
cancer fraud. As one district attorney
has pointed out, more money is spent
on quack remedies each year than on
legitimate drug research.
In the last five years the battle over
laetrile has been moving from the medical laboratories into the state legislatures, Congress, and the courts. This
movement will surely be quickened by
two stunning legal victories won recently by the proponents of laetrile.
These victories have not only opened

the door to its legal use but have cast
doubt on the legality of the entire system of drug regulation in the United
States.
Despite some confusion about the
biological mechanism, if any, by which
laetrile works, its supporters agree on
its content. It is amygdalin, a substance
any fairly sophisticated chemistry student should be able to produce from
fruits and vegetables found in any garden. Although amygdalin is in heaviest
concentration in apricot pits, substantial amounts also are found in a wide
variety of foods, including lima beans,
almonds, and cherries. Indeed, it would
be difficult to have a well-balanced diet
without ingesting a fair amount of this
substance every day.
The nature of the appropriate legal
regulation of laetrile depends on two
scientific findings. The first is whether
the use of laetrile is safe, and the second is whether it is effective in combating cancer. Before laetrile became a

political issue, almost all the formal
medical research demonstrated, or assumed, that laetrile was nontoxic. The
only evidence the medical profession
has offered to show that it is poisonous
appears to be in direct support of
the medical profession's political
arguments. At worst, laetrile has been
compared to the cassava root, a staple
of the diet for 200 million Africans,
which can be mildly toxic if taken in
extremely large amounts. No study has
shown that the dosage recommended
by physicians who prescribe laetrile in
the United States even approaches the
toxic level.
The efficacy of laetrile in treating
cancer in human beings has not been
fully explored, largely because preliminary animal studies have shown it
to be absolutely worthless and because
available cancer research funds have
been invested in research on drugs that
appear to be more promising. It is the
almost unanimous consensus of cancer

researchers, nevertheless, that laetrile
has no medical value in the treatment
of any form of cancer.
Neither side is satisfied with the research that has been done on the effectiveness and toxicity of laetrile. Given
the absence of any evidence that laetrile
is either useful or toxic, the question
may become whether the state and federal governments legally can and
should forbid the use of a substance
that can neither help nor hurt its users.
The federal government technically
does not forbid the use of laetrile. The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, however, forbids the importation or interstate transportation of any "new drug"
not approved by the F.D.A. or excepted
from the agency's jurisdiction. Under
this provision the federal government
has seized laetrile and enjoined its importation, thus preventing its subsequent use. Laetrile proponents argue
that amygdahn cannot be a "new drug"
because it is not a drug at all. They
claim it is merely a food supplement or
vitamin that when consumed regularly
retards the growth of several kinds of
cancer.
While the extraordinarily large
amount of laetrile sold in health food
stores makes plausible the claim that it
is not a drug, the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act defines a drug as an "[a] rticle intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, medication, treatment, or preven" 21 U.S.C. §
tion of disease ..
321(g)(1)(B). As the F.D.A. regularly
points out, laetrile is sold as a cure or
palliative for cancer or to prevent the
development of cancer. Thus the substance may be a food or a vitamin, but it
is also a drug and subject to all of the
statutory and regulatory limitations
imposed on drugs.
But is laetrile a "new drug"? It is if it
is not "generally recognized as safe and
effective" by experts qualified to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs. Although the safety requirement,
had been in the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act since the 1930s, the effectiveness provision was not added until
1962, in the wake of the thalidomide
scandal. This effectiveness provision
has created the problem for laetrile.
Since most scientific researchers agree
that amygdalin is worthless, it hardly
can be suggested that it is "generally
recognized as effective."
Thus the importation and interstate
transportation of laetrile is illegal, even
if it is perfectly safe, unless the drug is
excepted from the 1962 amendments to
the act. Those amendments specifically

except from the new drug requirements
any drug that is "generally recognized
as safe," whether or not it is effective,
that was commercially available in the
United States in 1962. Although the
F.D.A. continues to insist that laetrile
was not commercially available as early
as 1962, a 1953 California Medical Association broadside against the then
current use of laetrile as a cancer treatment contributes to the proof of the
continuous use of the substance for the
last 25 years.
Since laetrile was "generally recognized as safe" by experts in 1962, it
would seem that it should be grandfathered out of the 1962 amendments to
the act and that its effectiveness should
not be subject to F.D.A. inquiry. It is
against the backdrop of the apparently
arbitrary decision of the F.D.A. to require a new drug application for laetrile
despite its long and continuous use that
legislatures and courts have considered
the issue.
But even if laetrile cannot be imported or moved in interstate commerce, why can't it be used legally if it
is grown and processed locally? First,
many states lack either the facilities for
processing the drug or the climate for
producing it. Alaska, for example, was
the first state to legalize its use, and the
drug might be in use more commonly
there if a legislature also could cause
apricot trees to grow around the Arctic
Circle. Second, until 1977 virtually
every state had a statute that prohibited
the sale, provision, or use of any new
drug not approved by the F.D.A. These
laws made a crime of any local drug
transaction that would be prohibited if
it occurred in interstate commerce. Of
course, to the extent that the F.D.A.'s
limitations on laetrile are legally infirm, so are the correlative state limitations. In addition, some states - California, for example have made it a
crime to prescribe or promote any unproved cancer remedy.
The first real assaults on the regulation of laetrile occurred in connection
with attacks on these state statutes.
More than a dozen state legislatures
now have either repealed the statutes
limiting access to unapproved new
drugs or have excepted laetrile from the
scope of these statutes. The political revolt against what many people find to
be unwarranted government intervention in their private lives has not
created a huge legal market for the
drug; almost all of it still is imported,
and that remains illegal. Yet this public
reaction demonstrates a growing frus226

tration with government intrusion into
individuals' personal choice of medical
procedures
The battle over the use of laetrile was
born of smugglers and fought in Congress and the state legislatures. The
new battlefield, however, is the courtroom. For years the judicial arena was
used by the F.D.A. to enforce the ban on
the drug. For years courts uncritically
accepted the F.D.A. argument that it is
an unapproved "new drug," and the
lower federal courts consistently upheld the F.D.A. seizure of the substance
and enjoined its importation and transportation across state lines. The cases
brought by cancer patients who wished
to use the drug rarely made it into the
appellate courts because the patientplaintiffs did not live to see an appeal.
During recent times, however, the
courts have not been reluctant to look
behind the F.D.A.'s denomination of
the status of amygdalin and have found
the classification of the drug to be arbitrary and capricious. These same courts
may have curtailed even more substantially the government's authority to
regulate health care by deciding that at
least some applications of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act may violate a
patient's fundamental constitutional
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right to privacy and the doctor's right to
practice medicine as he deems appropriate.
The notion that an infirm person
should have a constitutional right to
choose any kind of medical treatment
available is not a 1970's invention. Two
centuries ago Benjamin Rush, surgeon
general of the Continental Army of the
United States and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, suggested that
the "Constitution of this republic
should make special provisions for
medical freedom as well as religious
freedom.... To restrict the art of healing to one class of men and deny equal
privilege to another will constitute the
Bastille of medical science. All such
laws are un-American and despotic.
They are fragments of monarchy and
have no place in a republic."
Although Dr. Rush's suggestion was
not heeded by the framers of the Constitution, the Supreme Court's recent
expansion and definition of the right of
privacy may have the same effect. That
right, articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was first
applied to assure a patient the free
choice of health care alternatives in the
abortion cases of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.

179 (1973). The right has been discussed in a wide variety of state cases,
and now the boundaries of the right to
choose medical treatment, as a part of
one's right of privacy, are being tested
by the advocates of laetrile.
That the constitutional right of privacy includes the right to treat one's
own body as one pleases can hardly be
doubted after the Supreme Court's decisions in the abortion cases. There are,
of course, several limitations on that
right. Although the crude practice of
arresting people for attempted suicide
has now largely disappeared, the statutes defining suicide as a crime remain
on the books. States do constitutionally
proscribe the use of some socially
harmful drugs. There are other circumstances, too, in which the government
may limit the risks to which an individual can subject his body; for example, several courts have upheld regulations that require motorcyclists to wear
helmets.
Although most courts that have addressed the issue agree it is improper
for the state to act solely for the protection of the individual from his own
folly, courts have always recognized a
state interest in protecting other members of the community and especially
dependents of the one asserting a right
to harm himself. Courts also have recognized a state interest in protecting

state resources and limiting the demand placed on state medical facilities.
The Alaska Supreme Court has concluded that the right of privacy in its
own constitution "shields the ingestion
of food, beverages, and other substances." Gray v. State, 525 P. 2d 524,
528 (1974). Although no federal court
has gone that far, the constitutional
cornerstone for this approach was laid
by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, in
which he specifically upheld the "right
of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional
judgment up to the point where an important state interest provides compelling justification for intervention."
That point, he explained, is reached
when the medical treatment sought to
be prohibited is more dangerous than
the state-sanctioned alternatives. At
least until that point is reached, the
constitutional right of privacy protects
the one seeking treatment and, apparently, the physician who offers that
treatment.
Thus, any right the courts develop to
protect the use of laetrile will have to be
weighed against the state's interest in
regulating the drug. The state's interest
is the protection of cancer patients and
their families from fraud. There are few
who are as vulnerable to snake oil
salesmen as people who are told they
have cancer. There are few people who

so desperately look for a positive,
guaranteed, and painless cure as those
who are told they will not recover from
a disease that can be treated only by
often painful and disfiguring surgery,
radiation therapy, and chemotherapy.
There is hope of treating some forms
of cancer only if the victim gets proper
medical treatment early in the course of
the disease. If a patient is cajoled into
trying laetrile before seeking traditional
help, it may be too late to help him
when he does seek more orthodox care.
The number of people who have been
lured away from proved treatments to
their death by the enticing arguments
in favor of a painless, "natural" cancer
cure is simply unknown. It is certain
that tremendous amounts of money
have been spent by desperate families
on worthless cancer cures. It is to aid
these medical consumers and their
families that the government has effectively banned the legal use of worthless, but harmless, drugs like laetrile.
On the other hand, there is no evidence the prohibition on laetrile has
caused any cancer patient to choose a
state-sanctioned alternative to amygdalin. In fact, many patients concurrently
undergo both traditional and laetrile
therapies. There is no doubt many
people who wish both laetrile and traditional therapy have been forced to
forgo traditional treatment because the
laetrile they desire is unavailable in
this country. The resources many of the
patients would have expended on the
orthodox care recommended by their
physicians are instead spent on travel
to and from Mexico to receive the drug.
How, then, has the judiciary balanced these competing interests? The
courts are no longer satisfied to accept
the F.D.A.'s administrative determination. Two dramatic opinions that have
come down recently demonstrate the
courts' new position. The first is
California v. Privitera, 141 Cal.Rptr.
764 (1977), in which James Privitera, a
physician, and several others were
charged with conspiring to sell an unapproved drug (laetrile) as a cancer
cure. Dr. Privitera originally had been
charged with the substantive crime, a
misdemeanor. After that charge was
dismissed by the municipal court
judge, Dr. Privitera was charged with
conspiracy to commit the misdemeanor, a felony in California. All of
the defendants were convicted of either
the substantive crime or the conspiracy
to commit it.
In reviewing the convictions, the
California Court of Appeal, in a twoFebruary, 1979 * Volume 65
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to-one decision, concluded that the
statute "as here sought to be applied
invades the patient's and doctor's zone
of privacy without a showing of external compelling state interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution."
The court recognized the agonizing
desperation of the patients treated by
Dr. Privitera: "The 19 witnesses testifying for Dr. Privitera conveyed a felt
imminency of death. One senses a mortal fear of both the disease and the orthodox alternatives. This is a desperate
utterly human seeking to avoid the pain
and to prolong life....
"To these 19 cancer victims ...the
denial ... of medical treatment, albeit

unorthodox, albeit unapproved by a
state agency, must surely take on a Kafkaesque, a nightmare quality. No demonstrated public danger, no compelling
interest of the state, warrants an Orwellian intrusion into the most private
zone of privacy....
"No compelling interest of the state
requires Dr. Privitera's ...cancer pa-

tients to endure the unendurable, to
die, even forbidden hope."
The opinion describes the right of
privacy, as it is applied to a patient's
right to use worthless drugs, only in
terms of terminally ill cancer patients.
The implication, then, is that the balance between the state's interest and
the individual's right of privacy may be
drawn in a different place, perhaps on
the side of the government's interest, in
the case of a patient with a cancer that
may be treated effectively under a traditional cancer management program.
Another portion of that opinion, however, may expand the class that can
claim protection under the right of privacy. The court held that the right of
privacy is not only a right of the patient
to treat his body as he may wish but
also the right of the physician to practice as he believes is appropriate. This
right, the court said, is not only derivative of his patient's right but stands independently as well. The Privitera case
was argued to the California Supreme
Court on April 5, 1978.
The second case is Rutherford v.
United States, 582 F. 2d 1234 (10th Cir.
1978), in which the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
Rutherford is an action initiated several years ago on behalf of "a class
composed of terminally ill cancer patients" against the United States to enjoin interference with the class's right
to acquire and use laetrile. To qualify as
a member of the class of "terminally ill
228

patients," a patient had to show a
"rapidly progressing malignancy"
leading to almost certain death and to
demonstrate either (1) that no orthodox
treatment could help, (2) that laetrile
would be used only in conjunction
with orthodox treatment, or (3) that he
intelligently and knowingly chose to
forgo recognized treatment and to be
treated with laetrile instead.
Although the other named plaintiffs
who began the suit with Rutherford
died years ago, Rutherford, who was
told in 1975 that surgery was necessary
immediately or death would be imminent, is still alive and using laetrile today. It is his surprising longevity, and
his use of the class action device, that
has allowed this case to be heard four
times by the federal district court, and
twice by the Tenth Circuit.
These cases are the
first salvos in a
new series of battles
The district court initially focused on
the administrative infirmities of the
F.D.A.'s determination that laetrile was
a "new drug." Indeed, the Tenth Circuit finally remanded the case to the
F.D.A. so that the agency could develop
a formal record on that issue. In Rutherford's first journey to the district court,
he sought and received a preliminary
injunction against governmental interference with his acquisition and use of
laetrile. His last trip to the district court
came after the F.D.A. had developed its
formal record and after the agency had
restated and supported its earlier decision that laetrile was an unapproved
"new drug." On this trip the court
ruled that the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious, that laetrile was
"grandfathered" out of the 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, and, finally, that the
government's prohibitions on the use of
laetrile by terminally ill patients was
inconsistent with those patients' right
of privacy.
Last July the Tenth Circuit upheld
the district court's decision but claimed
to limit its decision to the administrative issue. The court, however, was impressed by the obviously human hopes
of terminally ill cancer patients who
seek anything that might postpone the
inevitable. The court concluded that
requiring a drug to be "safe and effective" before it can be administered to
terminally ill patients is meaningless.
How can there be an "effective" drug
for a helpless condition? How can we
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reasonably prevent a patient who, by
definition, cannot be helped from using
a substance that will neither hurt nor
help? As Privitera did earlier, Rutherford limited its holding to terminally ill
patients, suggesting that there could be
limitations on others' use of the drug.
The Rutherford and Privitera cases
may be just the first salvos in a new
series of laetrile battles. What distinguishes them from the rest of the war is
that they are being fought in the courtroom, and the powerful medical interests are losing. The F.D.A. and its
power to regulate safe but ineffective
drugs is in jeopardy for the first time
since it was challenged by the drug
companies in the mid-1960s. The
rhetoric of deregulation, so common at
other federal agencies, has not been
heard from the F.D.A., but the spirit of
deregulation may yet be imposed by the
courts.
Of course, the war is not over. Both
sides had bills pending in the 95th
Congress that would amend the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. No court has
yet decided that a patient who is not
terminally ill has a constitutional right
to use laetrile. In addition, no one has
suggested the limitation of the heretofore unexercised power of both the
F.D.A. and the Federal Trade Commission to proceed against those who
falsely or fraudulently claim that laetrile cures cancer.
The analysis being applied by the
courts is summarized in an early district court opinion in Rutherford: "The
point can be couched in simple terms.
Many intelligent and mentally competent citizens in this nation have made a
deliberate decision that they would like
to employ an unproven and largely unrespected treatment in an effort to comfort, if not save, lives that orthodoxy
tells them have already been lost. They
do so with an acute awareness of professional medicine's assessment of
their choice." 429 F.Supp. 506 (D. Okla.
1977).
During the next few years many
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, will be forced to decide
under what circumstances, if any, that
choice must be respected. The war that
began either in a test tube, as the laetrile forces argue, or in the bank accounts of unscrupulous practitioners,
as the government suggests, finally will
be resolved in the courtroom. A
(Robert L. Schwartz is an assistantprofessor of law at the University of New
Mexico School of Law in Albuquerque.)

